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LinkedIn · Essay · 12 March 2026

The Nexperia Case: The Day Europe Woke Up to Economic Warfare

A European semiconductor company split in two over a dispute between the Netherlands and China. What happened, why it matters and what it means for European companies that depend on operations in China.

“Europe did not lose a company. It lost sovereignty.”

On the night of 3 March 2026, Nexperia’s Dutch headquarters shut down the email, Office 365 and SAP accounts of all its employees in China. Overnight, thousands of workers lost access to the internal systems of the very company they worked for.

Six days later, the Chinese subsidiary responded: it announced that it could now manufacture chips on its own, using technology the European parent company had not mastered. In practice, it declared itself independent.

There are now two Nexperias. One European, one Chinese. A company split in half because of geopolitics. This is not a story about chips. It is a story about what can happen to any European company that depends on China.

What does Nexperia actually do?

Nexperia makes basic electronic components: the small chips that make almost anything with an on-switch work, such as cars, phones, computers, medical equipment and household appliances. These are not the sophisticated chips that power artificial intelligence. They are the simple chips without which nothing starts.

The company controls around 40% of the global market for these components. If Nexperia stops, chatbots do not stop. Cars stop. Assembly lines stop. Hospitals stop.

Nexperia began in the Netherlands as part of Philips, one of the most emblematic names in European industry. It was later spun off and incorporated into NXP Semiconductors. In 2019 it was acquired by Wingtech, a Chinese electronics group listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Its headquarters remained in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Its owners were now in Shanghai.

And here the problem begins: the sale took place without any national-security scrutiny. In 2019, the Netherlands simply had no formal mechanism for reviewing foreign investment in strategic sectors. The transaction escaped prior scrutiny. A company controlling 40% of the global market for essential components was sold to a Chinese group without anyone asking: “What if geopolitics changes one day?”

Geopolitics changed.

The escalation: from partners to adversaries

In December 2024, the United States placed Wingtech on its restricted-entities list on national-security grounds. This meant that Nexperia, as a Wingtech subsidiary, could become subject to US export restrictions, putting its ability to sell chips to major European customers (including BMW, Volkswagen and Stellantis) at risk.

The Dutch government faced an unthinkable scenario: a company headquartered on its territory and supplying European industry could be paralysed by an American decision concerning its Chinese owner. The authorities also identified serious management failures: the Chinese CEO had removed the finance director, transactions with Chinese affiliates were increasing, and there was no contingency plan for the new sanctions environment.

On 30 September 2025, the Dutch government invoked the Goods Availability Act to give itself the power to block or reverse Nexperia decisions threatening the company and Europe’s value chain. Separately, independent court proceedings led to the CEO’s suspension and the transfer of voting rights to an independent administrator. These were distinct interventions and should not be confused with government nationalisation.

Beijing’s response was immediate. On 4 October, China banned exports of Nexperia chips manufactured on Chinese territory. In one move, it cut component supplies to half of the global automotive industry. Honda suspended production at factories in China and Japan. Nissan cut production at several plants. Germany’s automotive-industry association warned of serious supply risks in the first quarter of 2026.

Months of diplomatic negotiations between The Hague, Beijing and Brussels followed. China partially lifted its restrictions. The Dutch government temporarily suspended its oversight of the company. But the split within the company was already irreversible. The Chinese subsidiary declared itself independent of European management and, in March 2026, announced that it was already producing its own chips using 12-inch wafers, a technology the European Nexperia does not have. Technological decoupling stopped being an abstract threat. It is happening inside a single company.

How many Nexperias are there in Europe?

The Nexperia case is not an isolated incident. It is a symptom of a structural dependency that Europe, and the United States, chose to ignore for two decades.

According to recent Eurosystem survey data on industrial companies in three of Europe’s largest economies, more than one-third of German industrial companies depend on critical inputs from China. The figure is 20% in Spain and 17% in Italy. And 75% of German industrial companies say that an escalation of tensions with China would negatively affect their activity, even those with no direct relationship to the Chinese market, because of cascading effects through supply chains.

European companies with the greatest exposure to China collectively generated nearly €150 billion in revenue in the Chinese market in 2024 alone. These are companies in automotive, industrial machinery, electronics, chemicals and medical equipment. They are names everyone knows: BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, BASF, Siemens and ASML.

The dependency is not only commercial. Europe imports 98% of the rare earths it needs from China, the minerals essential for making batteries, wind turbines, military equipment and electronics. In April 2025, China restricted exports of these materials, directly affecting Europe’s defence and automotive sectors.

Every board member of a European company operating in China or relying on Chinese suppliers should ask a simple question today: if tomorrow a government, Chinese or American, decides to intervene in my value chain, what happens to my production? If the answer is “I don’t know” or “we have no plan”, then the company is in exactly the position Nexperia was in in 2024.

Is Europe prepared? No.

Wingtech’s 2019 purchase of Nexperia escaped scrutiny because no legal framework existed for it. Seven years later, Europe’s framework has improved, but it remains inadequate.

The new European regulation on screening foreign direct investment is expected to enter into force in summer 2026 (too late), with an implementation period of up to 18 months. Serious gaps remain until then. Final decisions on foreign investment are still national: the European Commission can issue opinions but has no veto power, which is incomprehensible. China can continue to channel investment through countries with weaker or incomplete rules. And greenfield investment, when a Chinese company builds a new factory in Europe rather than buying an existing one, remains largely outside the regulatory radar.

The Nexperia case exposes a fundamental contradiction: Europe wants to remain open to foreign investment but lacks the tools to distinguish between investment that strengthens the European economy and investment that creates strategic dependencies. While this ambiguity persists, we are playing a game whose rules we discover only after we lose.

Reshoring: no longer an option, an urgent necessity

The Nexperia case may be the turning point that forces Europe to do what it should have done a decade ago: bring production of strategic components back to European territory. Not out of protectionism, but for survival.

Nexperia Europe itself has announced a €275 million investment to expand production capacity outside China, with the aim of reaching 90% non-Chinese production by mid-2026. Factories are being expanded in Malaysia and the Philippines. Europe is slowly waking up to the need to diversify.

But diversification is not the same as protection. The real question is deeper: Europe must decide, once and for all, which sectors and technologies it considers sovereign, and treat them accordingly. Semiconductors, rare earths, batteries, telecommunications, digital infrastructure. These are not sectors where the free market alone guarantees European security. They are sectors where repeated political inaction has industrial, economic and ultimately national-security consequences.

On the night of 3 March, someone at Nexperia’s headquarters in Nijmegen clicked a button and cut thousands of Chinese employees off from the company’s systems. Six days later, the Chinese subsidiary announced that it no longer needed its parent company.

This is not a Dutch problem. It is not a semiconductor problem. It is a European problem. And every political or business decision-maker should lose sleep over this question: how many European companies are now in the same position Nexperia was in before it split in two?

The answer, probably, is more than we would like to admit.

Methodological note

Reporting on the Nexperia case is based on Reuters, Tom’s Hardware and CNBC, and official statements from Nexperia and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. Data on European dependence on China come from Eurosystem surveys (Bank of Italy, Bundesbank and Banco de España) of around 14,000 companies, and analyses by the Atlantic Council and the Centre for European Reform. Rare-earth data come from European Commission reports and specialist sector analyses. The new European foreign-investment-screening regulation is referenced on the basis of a Centre for European Reform analysis (March 2026).

Translation of the text in the author’s archive. Original publication: O Caso Nexperia: O Dia em Que a Europa Acordou Para a Guerra Económica · LinkedIn · Essay · 12 March 2026.
Original bibliographic details (Portuguese)

Ensaio de Miguel Sousa Soares, publicado originalmente no LinkedIn a 12 de março de 2026. Esta página é o arquivo pessoal do autor.

Miguel Sousa Soares is an economist and analyst of geoeconomics and artificial intelligence, with more than twenty years’ experience in strategy and corporate finance. He writes for Visão, Jornal de Notícias, Expresso and Correio da Manhã. He comments on artificial intelligence on NOW on Fridays.