Germany Is Europe’s Industrial Warning
The world’s largest chemical company has just decided where its future lies. It is not in Europe.
Last Thursday, BASF inaugurated its largest investment project to date in Zhanjiang, southern China: €8.7 billion, four square kilometres, 32 production lines and an electricity supply that is 100% renewable. This is more than an industrial inauguration. It is a strategic message. While Brussels multiplies speeches about competitiveness and autonomy, one of the most emblematic companies in German industry has placed the most ambitious project of its future outside the continent.
The gesture carries more weight because of who is making it than because of the sum involved. BASF is one of the symbols of what Germany built over decades: scale, production density and export capacity. When a company of this kind chooses to invest on this scale outside Europe, it is not diversifying risk. It is passing judgement on the continent’s appeal as a place to produce.
In the same month, the ifo Institute confirmed that job cuts in German industry were continuing, with no real signs of a reversal. When even Germany is losing industrial density, we are no longer looking at a national difficulty. We are looking at a continental warning.
In 2025, Germany accounted for 23.8% of EU GDP. In 2024, manufacturing generated 19.9% of the country’s gross value added, well above the European average. But the model is losing momentum. The economy grew by just 0.2% in 2025, following two years of contraction. Car production stood at around four million vehicles, far below the 5.6 million recorded in 2017. In chemicals, capacity utilisation was 72.5% and output fell by 3.3%. According to an IW Cologne survey, 41% of the industrial companies surveyed planned to cut staff in 2026. These are not figures of a slowdown. They are figures of erosion.
Europe treats each of these problems as if they were separate. They are not. The energy shock that followed Russia’s invasion left deep marks. The energy transition shut down nuclear power stations without securing a competitive alternative. What was presented as a path to energy autonomy under the Energiewende ended up deepening dependence, first on Russian gas, then on American liquefied natural gas. Pressure from China intensified with a new export shock. External demand weakened, demographic ageing took its toll, and underinvestment in digitalisation and scale could no longer be disguised. The OECD has been clear: weak business dynamism, low productivity growth and insufficient investment, compounded by high energy costs and administrative burdens.
But the most disturbing signal lies in the geography of investment. According to the Rhodium Group, German direct investment represented 71% of the EU total in China in 2022, 62% in 2023 and 57% in the first half of 2024. European industrial capital has not disappeared. It is choosing to grow outside the continent. There are moments when continents reveal themselves not by what they announce, but by what they can no longer retain.
Portugal is not on the sidelines. Autoeuropa produced 240,400 vehicles in 2025; the company’s preliminary estimate puts its contribution at 1.25% of national GDP that year. Germany is among its principal destination markets. ACAP figures cited by the U.S. Department of Commerce in its April 2026 update put Portugal’s automotive sector at around 167,000 direct jobs and 12.6% of goods exports; the country has more than 220 automotive suppliers. Portugal does not depend on one factory. It depends on a continental industrial ecosystem whose main anchor is more vulnerable. If Germany’s automotive industry contracts, the effects will reach Palmela before they reach any parliamentary debate in Lisbon.
Germany’s problem must be read as Europe’s problem. A Europe that loses its productive base weakens its defence, compromises the energy transition and reduces the technological autonomy it talks about so often. Batteries, semiconductors and defence systems cannot be made in an industrial desert. European sovereignty cannot be decreed. It requires a productive base.
The opening in Zhanjiang does not prove that German industry is in terminal decline. But it proves something serious: Europe can no longer assume that its industrial core will remain where it has always been. When the world’s largest chemical company puts the most ambitious investment in its history 9,000 kilometres from home, this is not a portfolio decision. It is a warning. And when Germany stops believing that this continent is the best place to produce the future, Europe should finally ask itself why it stopped being so.
Methodological note
The data used in this article come from: BASF (official announcement opening the Zhanjiang site, 26 March 2026); the ifo Institute (Employment Barometer, March 2026); Destatis and Eurostat (manufacturing’s share of gross value added and German GDP growth in 2025); VCI, the German Chemical Industry Association (2025 annual report); IW Cologne, the German Economic Institute (survey of around 2,000 companies, autumn 2025); the OECD (Economic Survey of Germany); Rhodium Group (“Don’t Stop Believin’: The Inexorable Rise of German FDI in China”, 2024); Volkswagen Autoeuropa (2025 production and preliminary GDP-impact data); and ACAP / the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (Portugal automotive-sector figures). The analysis and opinions expressed are the author’s sole responsibility.
Original bibliographic details (Portuguese)
Ensaio de Miguel Sousa Soares, publicado originalmente no LinkedIn a 2 de abril de 2026. Esta página é o arquivo pessoal do autor.
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Miguel Sousa Soares is an economist and analyst of geoeconomics and artificial intelligence, with more than twenty years’ experience in strategy and corporate finance. He writes for Visão, Jornal de Notícias, Expresso and Correio da Manhã. He comments on artificial intelligence on NOW on Fridays.