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Miguel Sousa SoaresMSS
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Essay · 13 October 2026

The Supplier Who Also Referees

American gas helped Europe break its dependence on Russia. But the supplier also writes the rules, and has yet to say whether the European Union counts as one country or 27.

Friday, 9 October. In Amsterdam, Europe’s benchmark gas price is close to €80 per megawatt-hour, two and a half times its level a year ago. In Washington, the US Treasury signs a licence. For six months, Russian diesel may be bought and sold despite sanctions, including imports by the United States itself.

The previous licences, covering Russian oil already loaded on ships, lasted one month. This one lasts six. No new sanctions law was needed. All it took was the hand that enforces it.

Washington threatens to punish those who buy Russian oil and gas. And authorises itself to buy Russian diesel.

The risk for Europe is not diesel. It is depending on an energy supplier that plays the game and referees it at the same time.

This year, according to a forecast by IEEFA, an American energy-analysis institute, the United States is expected to overtake Norway as Europe’s largest gas supplier. And it has yet to say whether, for its new sanctions law, the European Union counts as one country or 27. At stake in that answer are €554 billion in European exports to the United States.

Portugal accounts for €4.6 billion of those exports.

The law is called the Graham Act. It was enacted on 18 September. It provides for tariffs of up to 100% on everything sold to the United States by the countries it covers. The targets are the five largest buyers of Russian oil, the five largest buyers of Russian gas, and the five countries that do most to help circumvent sanctions. For gas, an exception requires two conditions: buying less than 15% of what Russia exports and having taken significant steps to reduce those purchases. There is no equivalent exception for oil.

Who could be caught? Senate aides have drawn up indicative lists. For oil, alongside China and India, they include Hungary and Slovakia, both served by the Druzhba pipeline. For gas, they include France, Belgium and, again, Hungary. The likeliest danger lies with oil, because there is no exception there. A tariff on Budapest or Bratislava would hit Audi in Győr and Volkswagen in the Slovak capital. But Hungary already knows how to get off these lists. In November 2025, Viktor Orbán went to the White House and returned with a one-year exemption from US sanctions on Russian energy. It was not this law. But a visit made the threat disappear. That year ends in November.

The extreme risk is hidden in one word. The law does not define what counts as a country. The law firm Squire Patton Boggs notes that it remains unclear whether the Union can be treated as one.

The difference is enormous. I ran the calculations using public data for 2025, the nearest complete calendar year to the twelve-month period measured by the law. Of the three European countries on the indicative gas list, none, in my estimates, comes close to 15% of Russian gas exports. France, the largest European buyer of Russian liquefied natural gas, is around 6%, by my estimates. Belgium is around 4%. Hungary had received about 7.5 billion cubic metres by pipeline by early December, according to Orbán himself. Extrapolating the supply rate for the rest of the year puts its share between 5% and 6%.

For the EU as a whole, the calculation changes. According to the Council of the European Union, the Union imported 36 billion cubic metres of Russian gas in 2025, close to a quarter of everything Russia exported.

On their own, none of the three reaches half the threshold. As a bloc, the Union exceeds it comfortably.

Being below the threshold is not enough. The exception only protects those who are reducing their purchases, and the law does not define what counts. The Union has the strongest possible argument: a regulation has already ended short-term contracts, in April for LNG and in June for pipeline gas, and bans long-term contracts from 2027. But the assessment is made on the other side of the Atlantic. And the figures do not help. In the first quarter of 2026, according to IEEFA, the Union’s imports of Russian LNG reached their highest level since 2022. That gas enters mainly through French, Belgian and Spanish ports, Squire Patton Boggs notes. France and Belgium, both on the gas list, may have to prove that they are reducing purchases while the Union’s figures point in the opposite direction. Even country by country, they are not safe.

The same law gives the referee three decisions to make: what constitutes a country; what counts as reducing purchases; and how much to charge, up to 100%.

There are good arguments against the harshest interpretation. The Congressional Research Service itself notes that, in ordinary usage, the Union may not be a country. It even allows that only purchases made by governments might count. In Europe, however, gas is bought mainly by private companies, so almost no one would be caught. The exception would be Hungary, where Russian gas is bought by MVM, a state-owned company. The law also permits tariffs only on countries that fit its lists, each of which has five places. The same service doubts that a 27-member union can fit into one of those places.

But these are interpretations, not guarantees. The people choosing between them are the ones enforcing the law: the President and the US Trade Representative. Every six months, they identify the five largest buyers again. And Washington does not have one fixed way of treating Europe. In 2019, in the Airbus case, it acted against the Union but selected targets country by country. In 2025, it negotiated with Brussels as a bloc, agreeing a maximum tariff of 15%. The same deal recorded Europe’s intention to buy more than €600 billion in American energy. Tariffs and gas sat at the same table. Washington chooses the approach that suits it, and whom to spare. Europe finds out afterwards.

It may be said that Washington would never impose tariffs on its largest gas customer. Probably it will not. But the referee’s power does not lie in blowing the whistle. It lies in being able to blow it. And that power does not depend on the harshest interpretation. Even if the Union is never treated as one country, the party that can punish or grant an exemption at the door to its market sits at the negotiating table from a position of strength. The 2025 deal already showed that. A 5 October analysis by the CSIS think tank concludes that the law’s value may lie less in the tariffs themselves than in uncertainty over when, how and against whom they will be used. A threat that is never carried out still exacts a price in every negotiation. Doubt works for whoever keeps it alive.

The law places that uncertainty in a single pair of hands. The Treasury can continue issuing licences without going through Congress. The President can waive any sanction or tariff. All that is required is a declaration to Congress that doing so is in the national interest. The diesel licence shows how this works. It came after a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, a few weeks before the midterm elections, with US diesel prices near record highs. Volodymyr Zelensky called it “a weak decision by strong partners”.

Brussels also allows exceptions. The Druzhba pipeline was left out of the oil embargo at Hungary’s insistence, and the Commission can suspend the Russian-gas phase-out timetable in a supply emergency. The difference is not transparency; American licences are public too. It is who decides. In the Union, exceptions have deadlines and are written into rules approved by governments and Parliament. In Washington, a Treasury licence or a presidential waiver is enough.

Portugal appears in this calculation twice. First, as a buyer. In 2025, according to energy regulator ERSE, 95% of the gas entering the country arrived by ship through Sines. Half of the unloading operations involved Nigerian gas; 43% involved gas from the United States. Three ships brought Russian gas. According to the government, the only company with a long-term contract for Russian gas through Sines is Spain’s Naturgy. These are legal purchases, with an end date. But if Washington treats the Union as one country, Portugal is exposed to the European total, not just its three ships.

Then, as an exporter. The €4.6 billion of goods Portugal sold to the United States in 2025, according to Statistics Portugal (INE), could face tariffs because of purchases Portugal does not control. Today, most of those goods pay up to €15 in duties for every €100 of value, the ceiling set by the 2025 deal. Under the maximum tariff, they could pay up to €115. And those tariffs would hit companies that already pay high energy prices. In September, according to Jornal Económico, the ceramics industry association ran a simulation: for a factory using 40 gigawatt-hours of gas a year, an increase in the price from €32 to €80 per megawatt-hour would raise the bill from €1.3 million to €3.2 million. Almost €2 million more before a single piece is sold. First, production becomes more expensive. Then selling becomes more expensive too.

This is where referee and supplier become one. Moving quickly away from Russian gas protects Europe from the Graham Act. But it pushes Europe towards gas supplied by the very party enforcing that law, in a tight market. With the Strait of Hormuz still recovering from the US-Iran war, Asia is competing with Europe for Atlantic cargoes.

There is an economic objection: dependence runs both ways. American producers need European buyers. In 2025, the Union received more than half of US LNG exports. That mutual dependence gives Europe leverage. But it does not prevent political decisions that run against producers’ interests, because the people deciding in Washington are not the people selling the gas. Asian demand also gives sellers other outlets. The sellers are numerous private companies. But contracting with ten companies from the same country does not protect against political risk that could hit all ten. In 2024, Washington paused decisions for almost a year on pending applications to export LNG to countries without a free-trade agreement with the United States, including EU Member States. It is possible to diversify invoices without diversifying risk.

From 18 October, new purchases of Russian oil and gas can be punished. If Washington treats China, India and Hungary equally, the law will be a rule. If it punishes some and spares others, it will be an instrument of favour. Sooner or later, it will also have to say whether the Union counts as one country or 27.

Europe can do three things.

First, it should demand a written interpretation of the law: whether the Union counts as one country and what reduction measures qualify for the exception. The answer would not prevent a future change, but it would require Washington to take a public position. That clarification should come before any further European concession under the 2025 trade deal, including energy-purchase commitments. Europe should not offer more in exchange for security that remains undefined.

Second, it should set out the conditions under which it would consider using the Anti-Coercion Instrument if Washington used tariffs to dictate energy decisions. The Union has had this instrument since 2023. It has never used it, either in the 2025 tariff confrontation or the Greenland crisis, despite several governments invoking it. Making those conditions public would give the threat substance and raise the political cost of backing down. An instrument invoked only in a low voice deters little.

Third, it should reduce concentration in the contracts it signs now. For strategic raw materials, the Union has already set a 65% benchmark for any single third country. The United States is heading towards two-thirds of European LNG imports. I propose a 50% per-source benchmark for all new long-term EU contracts, measured by annual volume and country of production. Fifty per cent is a precautionary choice: it prevents any one country from supplying a majority of new volumes. It does not eliminate existing dependence. It avoids extending it on the same terms. The aim is to have alternatives when the next contract is negotiated.

The difficulty is finding those alternatives. Until 2030, most new LNG is expected to come from the United States and Qatar. The benchmark should therefore allow temporary, justified and public exceptions where there is no safe alternative or the cost would be disproportionate. American gas already under contract will keep arriving. For new contracts, meeting the benchmark and the 2025 purchase intention would require more supply from other sources, such as Nigeria, new African projects and Qatar, once the Strait of Hormuz is safe again. Diversification may cost more. The question is whether it will cost more than having no alternative.

Since 2022, Europe has been working to stop depending on a supplier that used gas as a weapon. Now it risks depending on a supplier that decides when the rules apply. Europe does not control the whistle. It controls its exposure. The cost of saying no is the measure of European autonomy.

Sources and methodology

Sources are listed in the order in which they appear in the essay. The author’s own calculations are identified as such and can be reproduced from the data cited.

  1. Gas price on 9 October 2026. Dutch TTF, Europe’s benchmark, was close to €80 per megawatt-hour (Trading Economics, financial-instrument price, not an official exchange close; other sources report around €78 on the same day), about two and a half times the level in October 2025, close to €32/MWh.
  2. Russian diesel licence. US Treasury, OFAC, General License 135, dated 9 October 2026 and valid until 7 April 2027, expressly including imports into the United States; issued under existing sanctions, not the Graham Act. Earlier licences for Russian crude and petroleum products already loaded on ships: General Licences 134 to 134C, from 12 March to 17 June 2026, each for 30 days. Context: Donald Trump’s announcement on Truth Social on 9 October after a call with Vladimir Putin; US average diesel prices peaked on 22 September and remained close to that level on 9 October (AAA). Zelensky’s reaction, reported by Ukraine’s Embassy in Washington and quoted by AP: “a weak decision, unfortunately, a weak decision by strong partners”. The EU ban on Russian diesel has been in force since 5 February 2023.
  3. US gas becoming Europe’s and the EU’s largest supplier in 2026 (forecast). IEEFA, “Europe to source two-thirds of its LNG imports from US in 2026 as dependence deepens”, 13 May 2026. The same source forecasts that two-thirds of Europe’s imported LNG will come from the US in 2026 and says EU imports of Russian LNG in Q1 2026 reached their highest level since 2022 (6.9 billion cubic metres, up 16% year on year).
  4. Trade with the US in 2025. EU goods exports: €554 billion (Eurostat, 26 February 2026). Portuguese goods exports to the US: €4,601 million, around 6% of Portugal’s goods exports (INE).
  5. Graham Act. Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (H.R. 5334), enacted on 18 September 2026; text at GovInfo. Section 113: duties of up to 100% on all goods from countries described in subsection (c), covering three groups of five: the largest importers of Russian crude, the largest importers of Russian natural gas, and the countries that most facilitate evasion of Russian-oil sanctions, based on the preceding 12 months; subsection (d), an exception for gas only, for countries below 15% of Russian gas exports that have taken “significant steps” to reduce purchases, a term the law does not define; subsection (e), a new determination every 180 days; subsection (h), a prohibition on imposing tariffs on countries not expressly described in subsection (c). The law does not define “country” or set a minimum rate. Section 114 preserves earlier general licences and does not limit Treasury’s power to issue new ones. Section 115 permits a presidential waiver following a certification of national interest and a report to Congress. The period for measuring new purchases begins on 18 October 2026 (Squire Patton Boggs). Analyses consulted: Akin Gump, Covington, Davis Polk and Squire Patton Boggs.
  6. Indicative lists attributed to Senate aides. Crude: China, India, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan. Gas: China, France, Japan, Hungary and Belgium. Source: Squire Patton Boggs, “Sanctions by statute: The Graham Act and tariffs on Russia’s energy buyers”, 2026, which also notes that “questions remain over whether the EU may be treated as a single country”.
  7. Hungary’s exemption. On 7 November 2025, after a meeting between Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump at the White House, the US exempted Hungary for one year from American sanctions on Russian oil and gas (White House, Reuters and Al Jazeera). The Hungarian government described the exemption as indefinite; the White House set it at one year. It does not arise from the Graham Act.
  8. Author’s calculation: the share of Russian gas exports in 2025 represented by the countries analysed and the Union. Denominator: Russian gas exports were estimated at 142 billion cubic metres in 2023, including around 28 billion to the former Soviet Union (Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, February 2024). In 2025, exports to China rose by 16 billion cubic metres (38.8 versus 22.7); pipeline exports to the Union fell by around 10 billion after transit through Ukraine ended; and LNG remained broadly stable at 31.3 million tonnes, around 43 billion cubic metres (Reuters/LSEG, 5 March 2026). Result: the author estimates 140 to 150 billion cubic metres. Conversion: one million tonnes of LNG is approximately 1.36 billion cubic metres. France: 6.3 million tonnes of Yamal LNG (Urgewald, using Kpler data, 8 January 2026), around 8.6 billion cubic metres or 6%. Yamal is the source of almost all Russian LNG reaching Europe, and France receives no Russian pipeline gas. Belgium: 4.2 million tonnes from Yamal unloaded at Zeebrugge, around 5.7 billion cubic metres or 4%. Spain: 2.8 million tonnes of Yamal LNG, around 3.8 billion cubic metres or 3% (Enagás records 42,629 GWh of Russian-origin gas in 2025, a consistent order of magnitude). Hungary: around 7.5 billion cubic metres received via TurkStream by early December 2025, according to Orbán (Interfax and Turkish Minute, 9 December 2025); the author’s extrapolation, not an observed annual total: 7.5 × 12 ÷ 11 = 8.18 billion cubic metres, around 5.5% to 5.8%. EU: 36 billion cubic metres imported from Russia in 2025, by pipeline and ship (Council of the European Union, using Commission data), or 24% to 26%. Scale: 15% of the estimated denominator is 21 to 22.5 billion cubic metres. The 36 billion attributed to the Union exceeds that threshold; the estimates for France, Belgium and Hungary are below it. This comparison does not, by itself, prove the share of each of the 27 Member States. Limitations: country figures are estimates drawn from sources using different methods (LNG unloadings, pipeline flows and official totals), not an exhaustive count for all 27 Member States. The law measures the 12 months before enactment; the calculation uses calendar year 2025 as a proxy and does not calculate the share for the legally specified period.
  9. The EU phase-out of Russian gas. Regulation adopted by the Council on 26 January 2026, with Hungary and Slovakia voting against: short-term LNG contracts until 25 April 2026 and pipeline contracts until 17 June 2026; long-term LNG contracts until 1 January 2027 and pipeline contracts until 30 September or 1 November 2027; temporary suspension by the Commission in the event of a supply emergency. Russian LNG enters the Union mainly through French, Belgian and Spanish ports (Squire Patton Boggs).
  10. Congressional Research Service interpretation. “Tariff Authorities in the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026”, Legal Sidebar LSB11474, 3 September 2026, on the Senate-approved text. It includes the ordinary-meaning argument that the Union is not a “country”; doubt that a political union with more members than a list has places could be tariffed as one country; a narrow reading of “knowingly made new purchases” as purchases made by governments; and application by the President and US Trade Representative. In Hungary, the main buyer of Russian gas is MVM, a state-owned company with a 15-year Gazprom contract signed in 2021.
  11. Precedents. Airbus case: a Section 301 action against the Union, with tariffs from October 2019 on products selected mainly from France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. 2025 EU-US agreement: political agreement of 27 July and joint statement of 21 August 2025, with a 15% ceiling for most goods and a non-binding intention to purchase around €640 billion in US energy by 2028 ($750 billion).
  12. Uncertainty as the law’s value. CSIS, “The New Sanctioning Russia Act: Optics for Now, Leverage for Later”, 5 October 2026: “The value of the law may therefore lie less in the tariffs themselves than in the uncertainty”.
  13. European exceptions. Exemption of the Druzhba pipeline from the 2022 Russian-oil embargo, at Hungary’s request; the Commission may suspend the Russian-gas phase-out timetable in an emergency (see item 9).
  14. Portugal. ERSE data for 2025, released on 11 September 2026: 95% of gas entries came through the Sines terminal. By unloading operation, not volume, the origins were Nigeria 50%, the United States 43% and Russia 7%, corresponding to three ships. Naturgy as the only company with a long-term Russian-gas contract through Sines: statements by the Minister for Environment and Energy, February 2026. Current customs duties on EU goods: up to 15%, the ceiling in the 2025 agreement. The effect of a tariff of up to 100% on customs value, added to the existing 15% ceiling: up to €115 in duties per €100 of value, compared with up to €15 today.
  15. Ceramics-industry simulation. Jornal Económico, 17 September 2026, quoting Paulo Almeida of APICER: an industry calculation for a typical factory using 40 GWh of gas per year, not the bill of an identified company. Calculation: 40,000 MWh at €32 equals €1.28 million; at €80, €3.2 million; a difference of €1.92 million. Source consulted on 12 October 2026: Jornal Económico, 17 September 2026.
  16. US gas, the market and political risk. The Union received 54.3% of US LNG exports in 2025 (Banchero Costa, cited by Hellenic Shipping News). Hormuz: around one-fifth of global LNG trade passed through the strait, almost 90% of it bound for Asia (International Energy Agency); Iranian attacks on the Ras Laffan complex in March 2026 (QatarEnergy); US-Iran ceasefire in place since April 2026. US pause on decisions about pending applications to export LNG to countries without a free-trade agreement: US Department of Energy, 26 January 2024 to 20 January 2025. New LNG supply through 2030 is concentrated in the United States and Qatar (International Energy Agency).
  17. Proposals. Anti-Coercion Instrument: Regulation (EU) 2023/2675, in force since 27 December 2023; not activated to date, despite being invoked by several governments in 2025 and during the Greenland crisis in January 2026. Use requires a determination that a third country is seeking to influence a decision by the Union or a Member State. Non-binding 65% benchmark for any one third country for each strategic raw material by 2030: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252, Article 5. Information on large gas contracts provided to the Commission: Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, Article 14. The 50% LNG benchmark is the author’s proposal, as a precautionary choice; measured by annual contracted volume and country of production across new long-term EU contracts, with temporary, justified and public exceptions.
Translation of the text in the author’s archive. Original publication: O Fornecedor Que Apita · Essay · 13 October 2026.
Original bibliographic details (Portuguese)

Ensaio de Miguel Sousa Soares, publicado originalmente neste site a 13 de outubro de 2026.

Miguel Sousa Soares is an economist and analyst of geoeconomics and artificial intelligence, with more than twenty years’ experience in strategy and corporate finance. He writes for Visão, Jornal de Notícias, Expresso and Correio da Manhã. He comments on artificial intelligence on NOW on Fridays.